Subjects or Citizens? India, Pakistan and the 1948 British Nationality Act by Ansari, Sarah
 1 
 
 
 
 
SUBJECTS OR CITIZENS?:   INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE 1948 BRITISH 
NATIONALITY ACT 
 
Dr Sarah Ansari, 
History Department, 
Royal Holloway University of London. 
Egham, 
Surrey TW20 0EX. 
 
01784 443314 
 
s.ansari@rhul.ac.uk 
 
 
 2 
SUBJECTS OR CITIZENS?:   
INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE 1948 BRITISH NATIONALITY ACT* 
 
Sarah Ansari 
Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
 
It is now widely recognised that decolonisation, which picked up momentum from the 
mid-twentieth century onwards, was an extended affair.1  In the case of British India, 
independence may have taken place at relatively short notice in August 1947, but tying 
up the loose ends of empire stretched over many years.  In particular, the realignment of 
subjecthood and citizenship necessitated by decolonisation was protracted, and raised 
complex questions about identity in both the newly independent states and the former 
imperial power. Against this backdrop, the following article takes as its focus the 
drawn-out process of disengagement that followed formal independence in relation to 
one particular case study:  namely the various ways in which Britain sought to square 
the working of its 1948 Nationality Act with Indian and Pakistani citizenship legislation 
that took shape in the 1950s.  By exploring different aspects of how the Act was 
interpreted and applied in the South Asian context, it contributes to current 
understanding of the contested making of citizenship in post-1947 India and Pakistan.  
In the process, it also argues that while British legislation did not, in the late 1940s and 
50s, create a legal distinction between European and non-European British subjects, 
perceptions about ‘racial identity’ proved time and again to be a major factor in the 
classification of different categories of UK citizen, with “issues of race becoming more 
and more explicit in discussions, more and more public in debates” throughout this 
period.2    
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 The consolidation of two separate independent states carved out of British India 
proved to be a lengthy, difficult and messy business in the years following 1947.3  So 
did the process of establishing citizenship.  Both India and Pakistan faced the common 
challenge of establishing who now belonged within their new borders.  Both needed to 
identify how - and how far - to accommodate the millions of displaced refugees who 
were generated by the violence and uncertainties of Partition but whose Indian and 
Pakistani citizenship was not regarded as automatic.  At the same time, a key tenet of 
Britain’s decolonisation strategy during this period was “the preservation of post-
colonial ‘influence’, as opposed to the complete negation of empire”.4  This 
‘redeployment’ rather than ‘capitulation’ of power meant that Britain too was required 
to recalibrate its ideas about nationality and think afresh about the rights of its subjects 
in view of the revised sets of relationships that now linked colonies, old dominions and 
the ‘mother country’ within the Commonwealth.  In reality, applying the 1948 Act’s 
provisions in relation to India and Pakistan were infused with anxieties about ‘race’, 
something which surfaced repeatedly as British officials in London, Delhi, Karachi and 
consulates around the world sought to manage its operation in ways that suited British 
interests, and which reflected growing concerns in post-war Britain about controlling 
migration and manipulating nationality.5   
 The 1948 British Nationality Act has generated much discussion in relation to 
what precisely it reveals about British approaches towards decolonisation after the 
Second World War.  According to commentators such as Mycock, while the Act 
represented a “pragmatic recognition of the loss of India and the further dilution of ties 
with the Dominions”, much of its significance lay in its failure to define successfully 
the content and parameters of national or transnational citizenship, allowing all 
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Commonwealth citizens the right to enter and live in the United Kingdom without 
restriction.6  However, this approach, which has meant that the 1948 British Nationality 
Act has frequently been viewed in relation to immigration developments because its 
consequences appeared to play themselves out first and foremost within this 
framework, has been challenged. Hanson, like Baucom7, for instance, takes a different 
stance, emphasising instead that “for those who drafted and endorsed the legislation … 
immigration was tangential to the fundamental constitutional issue:  [and so it was 
rather] the need to ensure uniformity of British subjecthood, the possession of identical 
rights and privileges by all British subjects in the Commonwealth and Empire”, that 
provided the main motivation behind the Bill’s passage into law.8   
 Hence, under this scheme devised to refashion British nationality on a new 
basis, all those who belonged to either the Commonwealth or the colonies would still be 
regarded as ‘British subjects’.  Their citizenship, however, would vary, with self-
governing countries in the Commonwealth establishing their own, such as Australia and 
Canada (whose 1945 legislation had triggered the need for a rethink in the first place9), 
while remaining colonies were covered by the introduction of a new category, that of 
citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies (UKC).  The status of ‘British subject 
without citizenship’ was also created as a temporary measure for those people 
connected with countries that had not defined their citizenship laws by 1 January 1949.   
In practice, this category also extended potentially to British subjects resident in places 
outside the Commonwealth.  Finally, as part of the process, when self-governing 
countries had passed citizenship legislation, this, at their request, would then be 
‘declared’ by the Secretary of State in London under Section 32[8] of the Act.10  Any 
British subject who did not acquire an alternative Commonwealth citizenship under 
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recognised legislation would automatically then become a UKC citizen.  In this way, 
despite opposition from Conservative Party, the 1948 BNA intended for all British 
subjects to have one form of Commonwealth attachment or another.11  And it was 
framed on the assumption that the citizenship measures enacted by Commonwealth 
countries would be reasonably comprehensive and so only a comparatively small 
number of people would become UKC citizens after recognition by the Secretary of 
State.   
 But while most Commonwealth countries quickly enacted legislation that was 
duly declared by the British government for the purposes of the BNA,12 this did not 
happen as far as India and Pakistan were concerned.  India took until 1955 to introduce 
a specific citizenship act (though its 1950 Constitution did contain certain provisions 
regarding citizenship) but London regarded this as too limited in scope to be 
recognised.  Pakistan’s equivalent legislation in 1951 and 1952 was likewise deemed by 
the British as unacceptably obscure.13  Crucially, neither the Indian nor the Pakistani 
measures of the early 1950s provided for the acquisition of citizenship by many people 
of Indian or Pakistani origin (or, as it was articulated at the time, ‘race’) who, British 
officials argued, ‘naturally’ belonged to those countries.  In addition to the many 
hundreds of thousands of former refugees living in India and Pakistan whose 
citizenship status remained unclear in the decade following Partition, there were large 
numbers of people of South Asian origin scattered around the world.  Why this scenario 
worried London so much was that, in the event of the Indian or Pakistani measures 
being declared by the British government before their citizenship had been fixed, all of 
them as ‘British subjects without citizenship’, officials feared, would by default become 
UKC citizens despite very few obvious (that is ancestral) ties with the United Kingdom.  
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By the mid-1950s, by which time pressure was building up for restrictions to be placed 
on New Commonwealth immigration to Britain,14 the British authorities faced the 
dilemma of whether or not to recognise citizenship legislation that, from their 
perspective, threatened consequences “so anomalous and so different from what 
reasonably have been expected to happen when the British Nationality Act was 
passed”.  According to one Home Office official, 
The embarrassments which might arise from Her Majesty’s Government in the 
United Kingdom becoming responsible for the protection of these people as 
citizens of the UKC are obvious, but, even if we were to decline to ‘recognise’ 
the Indian and Pakistani measures on the grounds that the results were be so 
contrary to the intention of the Act, the people concerned would remain British 
subjects without citizenship and we should not be able to regard the United 
Kingdom government as absolved from all responsibility towards them.15   
 
 This article accordingly explores the various different anxieties that surrounded 
the process of enforcing the BNA in relation to what had formerly been British India 
and its people.  It first considers how the Act was put into operation in the subcontinent 
and its effects on the way in which entitlement to British citizenship was identified 
there in the years immediately following independence.  It then highlights and explains 
the ambivalent role taken by London in relation to the framing of citizenship rules in 
both India and Pakistan, and the British government’s reluctance to recognise any of 
this sub-continental legislation until and unless the move suited British interests.  
Finally, it investigates the impact of the BNA on ‘potential Pakistanis’ living in other 
parts of the world, whose citizenship status, like that of ‘would-be Indians’, was fraught 
with complications as a result of their ambiguous place within a revised set of 
Commonwealth relationships.  While the BNA had sought to formalise the existing 
status quo by giving the right to enter, work and settle in Britain to all colonial and 
Commonwealth citizens, racialised concepts of Britishness (which rested, as Paul 
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argues, on “an existing racialised understanding of the imperial population”16) 
underpinned its application.  By focusing on India and Pakistan,  and ‘potential 
Pakistanis’ in particular, this article provides new evidence of just how acutely aware 
British officials, tasked with applying the Act’s regulations abroad, were of the need to 
find ways of limiting Britain’s responsibilities in relation to people from its former 
colonies, especially as far as discouraging colonial movement to the ‘mother country’ 
was concerned:  “bent on keeping the number of Indians and Pakistanis entering Britain 
to a minimum”, their frustration “was almost audible in their memos and despatches”.17  
In the process, British decision-making became caught up in what Chatterji has 
described as the “startling symmetries” of Indian and Pakistani efforts to legislate their 
own newly-acquired citizenships in ways that would define, and defend, their new 
national identities vis-à-vis each other .18 
 
Applying the BNA in India and Pakistan 
 
The introduction of the BNA caused considerable initial confusion in the subcontinent, 
particularly among European British subjects, many of whom were extremely 
indignant, as well as apprehensive, when required by this legislation to prove their 
entitlement to UKC citizenship.  Racial identity (albeit infused with the added 
complication of class) was always a sticky issue under the Raj, but for many of those 
Europeans who had stayed on in the subcontinent after independence there was no 
reason for any confusion about their status.19 After all, “whiteness” had been intimately 
associated with the “running of empire”.20  Social contact between the rulers and the 
ruled had been minimal, and it was only in the advent of independence that this ‘racial’ 
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distance had come to be challenged seriously:21  clubs, the social hubs of empire, for 
instance, with few exceptions had kept Indians at bay for as long as they could, and 
where possible still continued to do so after 1947.22  The size of the ‘white’ community 
in independent India was estimated by British officials at between 20,000 and 25,000, 
while first-generation Anglo-Indians alone,23 a large proportion of whom it was 
anticipated would claim UKC citizenship, were calculated to be in the region of at least 
50,000.  Equivalent numbers in Pakistan were fewer but no less significant in British 
eyes.24  Initially, much of the disquiet generated by the BNA involved individuals who 
did not regard themselves as either Indian or Pakistani, and hence sought to establish 
their direct ancestral links with the United Kingdom, even when this was several 
generations back or via what had become the Irish Republic.   Apparent ‘anomalies’ 
quickly became evident, with UK High Commissioner in Delhi pointing to the 
contradiction between “the acceptance of extremely dark Anglo-Indians as United 
Kingdom citizens, and the rejection of pure Europeans who have been unable to satisfy 
me as to their descent in the male line’.25  Tension between ‘race’ and identity thus 
coloured the way in which officials approached the BNA’s application from the outset. 
The first draft of a new British nationality bill arrived in the offices of the 
United Kingdom’s High Commissioners in India and Pakistan in September 1947.  For 
some time before that, they had been discussing the question of compiling a census of 
their ‘parish’ but had agreed to defer action until the full implications of the Act were 
properly studied.  Following the appointment in November 1947 of a Legal Advisor to 
be shared by both High Commissions, it was decided that provisional registers should 
be drawn up as far as was possible before any legislation came into force.  These 
‘Records’ were intended to provide the British authorities with a detailed list of people 
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for whom Britain would be responsible in the event of emergency, or to whom the High 
Commissions might be required to issue passports.  They would also include others 
who were thought likely to be eligible, either automatically or through registration, for 
UKC citizenship, and so were expected to serve as useful guides once the actual 
consideration of applications for registration began.26  Because of inevitable confusion 
in the public mind between inclusion in the High Commissioner’s Record and statutory 
registration as a UKC citizen, it was recognised that delicacy and tact were going to be 
needed, especially with regard how to handle the large body of Anglo-Indians directly 
affected by the Act’s provisions.27   
 Once the revised draft bill was published in February 1948, the Legal Advisor 
proposed a ‘Provisional Recording’ of future UKC citizens under the new Act, a 
register that would in due course automatically become an up-to-date Record of such 
citizens with any others in the future only able to qualify through registration.  He then 
went on to work out preliminary drafts of an application form, containing an elaborate 
questionnaire and lengthy explanatory notes, while assistant legal advisors (retired 
Indian Civil Service officers with judicial experience) – one for India and another for 
Pakistan – were appointed by April to relieve him of the routine work of deciding 
doubtful cases. In the meantime, Deputy High Commissioners stationed around the 
subcontinent learned of the preliminary role that their outposts were to play:  
distributing forms to would-be applicants, then receiving, registering and vetting 
applications before forwarding them when in order and accompanied by the necessary 
documents to (in the case of India) Calcutta and (Pakistan) Karachi.  Broadly-speaking, 
the same procedure was followed in both India and Pakistan, and close coordination 
was maintained.28   
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 The application form tackled the question of ‘race’ head on by requiring people 
to classify themselves according to one of four so-called ‘racial’ categories:  “British 
Europeans”, “British Colonials”, “Anglo-Indians” and “Anglo-Pakistanis”.  The first 
two “consisted of persons with not less than 75% British or Colonial descent”.  These 
were supposed to be treated on the same footing, and were apparently only needed to be 
distinguished “because of the obvious absurdity of labelling a full-blood Negro or 
Polynesian a ‘British European’”.29  But even those who claimed that their father had 
been born in the United Kingdom were required to state the birthplace of their mother, 
an obligation that was later acknowledged as solely for the purpose of racial 
classification:  as a 1950 report on the working of the BNA in India explained,  
Racial classification [was] introduced in order that British Europeans might be 
given priority of protection in the event of an emergency, as it was feared that 
otherwise they might be overwhelmed by crowds of Anglo-Indians.  For this 
reason, it could not be made public, and nothing was said about it in the 
Explanatory Note.  However, the reason for the question about the birth-place of 
the mother was not difficult to guess, and as it was likely to be resented by the 
British Community, the High Commissioner was urged to abandon it. 
 
When the UK High Commissioner’s Office in Delhi suggested to the editor of the 
Statesman that the newspaper, which was widely read by ‘British Europeans’ in India, 
should give the operation a “good press”, the latter declined on the grounds that it 
would be “extremely difficult to say anything convincing to readers who enquire, for 
example, why when descent is traced through the male line, enquiry should be made 
into the mother’s antecedents”.  Such criticisms were passed back to London, where 
officials nevertheless reiterated that the information was essential for what they again 
termed ‘racial classification’ reasons.30 
 On 30 July 1948, the BNA received royal assent.31  Plans to make a start on 
compiling the Record before the Act came into operation at the beginning of 1949, 
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however, were delayed by problems in producing the necessary documents.32  The 
Legal Advisor’s ‘Explanatory Note’ met with particularly severe criticism both from 
Deputy High Commissioners and leading members of the ‘British’ community in the 
subcontinent, who thought that it would prove largely unintelligible to most of those for 
whom it was intended.  WHJ Christie, Advisor in India to the Central British 
Committee, for instance, was “quite certain that only one person in ten of those who 
receive it will be able to understand it at all”, and suggested that it be redrafted in 
simpler language.33  Advertisements, however, duly appeared in leading daily 
newspapers, with copies sent to local United Kingdom Citizens’ Associations, principal 
British firms and chambers of commerce, and clubs and hotels, to be displayed on their 
notice boards.  As a result, by early June 1950, when the temporary lease on the Central 
Registration Office in Short Street, Calcutta, had expired, over 26,000 applications for 
inclusion in the Indian Record had been received, of which 24,245 had been handled, 
with 15,684 accepted and 8,561 refused.  The remaining balance was then returned to 
outposts to process in addition to those that they would continue to receive.  In fact, 
these later applications proved to be considerably more numerous than anticipated, with 
the result that by the end of 1949 the names of over 25,000 potential citizens had been 
recorded, and only 1,137 of them by registration.  Around 4,000 of the trickier cases 
were referred to the Assistant Legal Advisor in India, who in turn kept in close touch 
with his counterpart at Karachi, each consulting the other on points of difficulty.  
Inevitably some were referred to London for more complex adjudication.34   
 Work on compiling the Record and registering claims was continually 
hampered, however, by misunderstandings of the legal position and terms used, 
particularly on the part of those submitting their names.  Officers found it difficult to 
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make clear to applicants that the status of ‘Citizen of the UK and Colonies’ had not 
existed before the BNA and so did not mean the same as ‘British subject’ or even 
‘European British subject’.  Similarly, the phrase ‘potential citizen of the UK and 
Colonies’ caused many problems, with doubts over its usage even raised in the House 
of Commons.35  As this work had begun before the Act itself had taken effect, the 
description had been included in all the printed documents to denote persons who were 
expected to become citizens on, or following, 1 January 1949.  But while it was not 
used after that date, and explanations were accordingly circulated, officials confessed to 
finding it very difficult to undo the false impression that had been created, and a good 
deal of puzzlement lingered on.36 
 Throughout this period, the size of the operation in Pakistan proved to be 
considerably smaller than that in India. By the end of 1950, approximately 5,500 names 
had been entered on the Record there, of which just over one thousand had been 
admitted by registration and the remainder by qualification under the transitional 
provisions of the BNA.  These fewer numbers in practice made it unnecessary to set up 
a Central Registration Office along Calcutta lines.  Instead the compilation of the 
Record was decentralised to United Kingdom passport offices in first in Karachi, and 
then to the major cities of Dacca and Lahore as well, all of which had started receiving 
applications by the end of November 1948.  As the High Commissioner there 
commented, this smaller-scale undertaking in Pakistan resulted in less likelihood of 
divergent treatment of applicants belonging to the same family.  All the same, there 
were occasional instances of one member of the family being registered and another 
refused, with the majority of these particular cases arising out of a failure in liaison 
between Karachi and Delhi.  In addition, the High Commissioner recommended that 
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people of European descent, who had been naturalised in India under the 1914 British 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, and who were deemed by officials to have a 
sufficiently close connection with the United Kingdom, be given the opportunity to 
acquire UKC citizenship.  More generally, he estimated that between 60 and 70 per 
cent of the total number of applicants were of “pure European descent”, while of those 
admitted by registration not more than 30 per cent could be described as such.37   
 For many caught up in this bureaucratic tangle, the way in which privileges or 
restrictions on claims to citizenship became linked to racial identity, magnified levels of 
anxiety, particularly within Anglo-Indian communities.38 But, even so, whether in parts 
of the subcontinent that had become India or Pakistan, the operation to record and 
register potential UKC citizens was hampered by the fact that a large number of those 
who were likely to qualify automatically did not submit completed forms by the 1 
January 1950 deadline. It is possible that some may not have taken the matter seriously, 
unaware of the consequences of being omitted from the Record.  But, apart from those 
within “the British community [who were not] ‘form-minded’ [and] put off by the 
complicated appearance of the reading matter sent to them [would have thrown] it in 
the waste paper basket”, there were others who, it seems, deliberately chose not to 
register.  These included  
People in Indian Government service who would have been eligible for 
registration under Section 12[6] but [who] were very careful not to apply in case 
they lost their Indian Citizenship and thus their jobs.  Some are even UK 
Citizens by descent (including, I think, the Chief Passport Officer himself!), but 
have made no move to establish their UK Citizenship for the same reason.39 
 
To complicate matters further from an official British perspective, the compilation of 
the Record seemed to be seriously undermining the popularity and prestige of both 
High Commissions, with many “pure British people”, because they and their fathers 
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had been born in British India, expressing their resentment at having to wait for too 
long (or sometimes what seemed like indefinitely) before obtaining confirmation of 
their citizenship.40   
 The main problem for officials when weighing up applications under the terms 
of the BNA, however, was how to decide whether an applicant’s connection by descent 
with the United Kingdom and its remaining colonies, coupled with any existing links 
with these parts of the Commonwealth, amounted to an association that was sufficiently 
close to justify their registration as a UKC citizen.  For ties on the mother’s side, little 
help in most cases was to be had from documentary evidence, with officials often 
having to rely on appearance alone, reinforcing the likelihood of race blurring identity.  
Many applicants, such as the Anglo-Indians filling subordinate positions in the railway 
service (guards, drivers and firemen), tended to live in relatively inaccessible places, 
but still a large proportion of what were regarded as the doubtful cases were 
interviewed, sometimes by touring officers but more often by members of the local 
United Kingdom Association deemed responsible or trust-worthy from a British 
perspective.41  As the High Commissioner in Delhi pointed out in January 1951 in 
relation to the registration of minors, 
All degrees of connection are possible and need careful investigation, though 
the requirement the child must be pure or nearly pure European will [rule] out 
most of the doubtful cases.  There are many families in India with a very slight 
admixture of Indian blood (one Indian great grand-parent or the equivalent gives 
only 14.25% [sic] Indian blood) and if they have maintained a close connection 
with the United Kingdom the child can be treated in the same way as a pure 
European.42 
 
In addition, the rule of thumb was that “British subject” passports were not issued to 
any applicants who might otherwise qualify as Indian citizens, unless they had first 
obtained in writing that the Indian authorities did not regard them as one.  Few 
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individuals in this position, however, managed to obtain the necessary ruling precisely 
because their Indian domicile seemed unambiguous.  Accordingly, the policy proved to 
be very restrictive, resulting in many, including some apparently “pure” Europeans, 
having to travel on Indian passports during this period of transition.  And, where British 
travel documents could be issued or renewed, this tended only to be permitted for a 
limited period.  Hence the Calcutta office complained,  
It is bad enough when we issue a “British Subject” passport for one year only to 
be told by the applicant that somebody in the same position as himself was 
given a similar one valid for five years in London.  How much worse is it when 
we refuse to issue a passport at all, to be confronted by the applicant on his 
return from leave waving in our face a “British Subject” one issued to him in 
London, valid not merely for one year but for five.  It makes the service we give 
look pretty poor and it creates a good deal of bad feeling amongst the European 
population out here who, for one reason or another, cannot establish United 
Kingdom citizenship.43 
 
In the face of such inconsistency, the Foreign Office back in London was eventually 
persuaded in 1954 to allow High Commissioners to issue passports of full validity and 
renew existing passports for more than one year, but this could only be done for 
applicants “with a definite connexion [sic] with the United Kingdom but [who] do not 
appear to be Indian or Pakistani citizens”.44  While an individual’s eligibility for the 
citizenship of another state ruled out the UKC option, it would seem that ‘looking 
British’ often played a large part in determining who potentially belonged where. 
 
Legislating citizenship 
 
London’s efforts to apply the BNA in the context of South Asia were thus complicated 
by the need to synchronise its rules with citizenship legislation that was taking shape in 
India and Pakistan.  But determining who qualified for citizenship in the bitter and 
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confused aftermath of Partition, thanks to which millions had migrated and hundreds of 
thousands died, was no straightforward task for either state.  As Pandey, Chatterji, 
Zamindar and more recently Roy have all demonstrated in relation to Partition’s 
implications for identity and belonging in the subcontinent, both engaged, at least to 
begin with, in piecemeal efforts to devise ways of identifying who was and who was 
not to be deemed one of their citizens.45  ‘Otherness’ together with processes of 
exclusion and inclusion proved central to the whole business of establishing 
citizenship.46  “Dissonance between [a] proffered nationality and its material 
realisation” quickly became a pressing concern since this directly related to how 
citizens-in-the-making moved across the newly demarcated borders that had come to 
divide the subcontinent and the people living in different parts of it.47  From travel 
permits to the introduction of passports, the room for manoeuvre, embittered by painful 
memories of Partition-related violence and mass displacement, steadily narrowed until 
it became increasingly difficult (though never wholly impossible) to negotiate 
travelling between the two states.48   
 In the case of India, provisions relating specifically to citizenship were brought 
into force a couple of months before the rest of the country’s new constitution was 
promulgated on 26 January 1950. 49 But it took a further five years before the Indian 
parliament eventually passed its first formal separate piece of citizenship legislation.  
Meanwhile, a blueprint for citizenship took gradual shape in Pakistan, initially in the 
form of its 1951 Act, and then in an amended bill and set of rules that were introduced 
in 1952 to clarify procedures but which in turn then required further clarification.  From 
1948 onwards, therefore, British officials kept a watchful eye on developments, and 
indeed often received requests from their Indian and Pakistani counterparts to give 
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advice.  British anxieties were evident throughout.  Acutely aware that recognition of 
any legislation would make it necessary to decide which ‘British subjects without 
citizenship’ would henceforth be citizens of Pakistan or India, and which had become 
UKC citizens,50  London was certainly not prepared to take the risk of responding until 
it could be sure that doing so would not result in the creation of thousands of potentially 
‘stateless’, non-European, people, who (thanks to Section 13[2] of the BNA) would 
then automatically become Britain’s long-term responsibility.51  Underpinning much of 
the discussion and decision-making was how to interpret what ‘domicile’ meant in 
individual cases.  From an official point of view, both British and ‘sub-continental’, the 
definition of ‘domicile’ was legally understood as ‘the principal place of residence of 
an individual’.  In British law, which had left its imprint on the subcontinent, domicile 
was the status or attribution of being a permanent resident in a particular jurisdiction. A 
person therefore could be regarded as remaining domiciled in a jurisdiction even after 
they had left it, as long as they had maintained sufficient links with that place or had 
not displayed an intention to leave it permanently (that is, moved to a different state, 
but not demonstrated the all-important intention of remaining there indefinitely).  In 
addition ‘domicile of origin’ was taken to mean the home of a man’s parents, not the 
place where, his parents being on a visit or journey, a child happened to be born, and so 
it was distinguished from any accidental place of birth.  In order to change someone’s 
domicile, there had to be an actual removal with an intention to reside in the place to 
which they had moved.  However, as debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly 
during these years underlined, interpreting ‘domicile’ in the context of the fluid and 
uncertain circumstances of Partition was a very touchy subject that generated both 
“sentimental” and “aggressive” responses when discussed.  As one member of the 
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Assembly exclaimed in 1949:  “If anyone does not … get himself registered as an 
Indian citizen, then that ought to be a proof in the eyes of the authorities of the country 
where he is living that he is not an Indian citizen but a citizen of the country of his 
adoption”.52  
 According to the Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951, promulgated on 13 April 
that year, Pakistan citizenship could be acquired by birth (section 4 of the Act), by 
descent (section 5), by migration (section 6), by naturalisation (section 9) and by 
marriage (section 10).  Every person born in Pakistan after the commencement of this 
Act was to be deemed a citizen of Pakistan ‘by birth’.  Likewise, a person born after it 
had commenced was also entitled to citizenship ‘by descent’ as long as their parent was 
a citizen of Pakistan at the time.  As far as citizenship ‘by migration’ was concerned, 
the federal government upon obtaining a certificate of domicile could register as a 
citizen of Pakistan any person who had migrated to its territories between the time 
when the Act came into force and 1 January 1952.  Registration in such cases would 
include, besides the person himself, his wife if any (unless the marriage had been 
dissolved), and any minor (under 21 years old) whether wholly or partially dependent 
upon him.  ‘Naturalisation’ applied to foreigners (defined as a person not born in any 
Commonwealth country) living continuously in the country for five years, who had 
learned one of Pakistan’s recognised languages, and taken the oath of allegiance to the 
Pakistani constitution.  Finally, there was the matter of citizenship ‘by way of 
marriage’, something that was available to a woman by virtue of becoming the wife of 
a Pakistani man:  if she was not deemed a ‘foreigner’, marriage would make her a 
Pakistani almost automatically.53  The High Commission in Karachi could detect little 
public interest in the legislation when it was first introduced in October 1950.  Press 
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comment was confined to a leader in the English-language daily newspaper, Dawn, 
which took exception to the term “Pakistani British subject” still being used in 
Pakistani passports.  The Pakistan government was quick to promise that the bill, when 
enacted, would set matters right.  Later, once the legislation had been passed, Dawn’s 
editors commended it as befitting of a sovereign state and expressed pleasure in the fact 
that “this odious label which Pakistani passports have been bearing will no longer be 
affixed to Pakistani names”.54   
Many parts of the 1951 Pakistani legislation were directly modelled, not 
unexpectedly, on corresponding sections of the 1948 BNA, but even so from a British 
perspective the draft bill was full of pitfalls.  The Pakistan government had formally 
invited British comments on its provisions, but in the event neither the High 
Commission in Karachi nor officials back in London were given enough time to study 
them in detail before the bill came before the Assembly earlier in 1951 than expected.55  
Thus, the final version comprised what British officials at the time regarded as 
“transitional provisions” that were far from complete, and, as it turned out, they were 
informed unofficially that the Pakistani government was already intending to propose 
further amendments once it had gained some practical experience of the operation of 
the law.  A representative of the Pakistan Ministry of the Interior, Hamiduddin Ahmed, 
during an informal conversation in May with the High Commissioner, HSH Stanley, 
went as far as apparently suggesting that, as the rules currently stood, Britain risked 
becoming “a dumping ground for the unwanted”.56  Stanley himself echoed similar 
concerns that the UK looked set to be “a dustbin for the refuse discarded by” India and 
Pakistan, acquiring in the process, in his words, “the scum of the earth”.57  One 
immediate quandary was that the legislation seemed to contain no provision for 
 20 
automatic ‘citizenship by descent’ for people who were alive when the Act became 
applicable.  Accordingly, British officials predicted that thousands of people would be 
denied a guaranteed right to Pakistan citizenship by its provisions.58  It did not take 
long before the High Commission in Karachi started to receive enquiries from 
individuals uncertain about their status.  As many of these cases highlighted, the reality 
was that many people of South Asian origin would qualify for UKC citizenship if they 
were not accepted as either Pakistani or Indian under the new arrangements, and should 
London recognise citizenship legislation before these anomalies had been satisfactorily 
resolved.59   
Hence, from the outset, the British government was intensely conscious of, and 
worried about, the need to delay official recognition of the Pakistani legislation.  After 
all, this was “a complicated problem” that demanded maintaining “a balance between 
keeping the Pakistanis happy and saving London as far as possible from taking as UK 
citizens a mass of persons of Pakistani race who ought to be Pakistani citizens”.60  As 
the Commonwealth Relations Office later reiterated, “we have to consider what action 
by us is best calculated to ensure that as many as possible British subjects without 
citizenship [but] potentially citizens of Pakistan do in fact become and remain Pakistan 
citizens and do not become United Kingdom citizens”.  By the end of August 1951, 
however, the British authorities had received their first request to recognise the 
Pakistani legislation.61  But while the High Commission acknowledged the note and 
passed it onto London, the decision was made there to “let this request rest for the 
moment”.62  
 Similar doubts were expressed about what to do with India in the event of it 
finally passing its own equivalent legislation, with officials suggesting that it might be 
 21 
necessary to amend the BNA itself “if we are not to be swamped by a flood of potential 
Indian citizens [should] they fail to register as Indians”.63  For, as the High 
Commissioner in Delhi explained, 
If the Indians apply the normally accepted definition of ‘domicile’ as ‘fixed 
habitation’, almost all Anglo-Indians and probably a large proportion of 
naturalised persons should qualify as Indian citizens … On the other hand, some 
Anglo-Indians, and perhaps a large number of naturalised persons, may not wish 
to become Indian citizens.  They may attempt to persuade the Indian authorities 
to certify that they are not Indian citizen.  The Indians for their part may be 
disposed to agree on the ground that they do not want unwilling citizens.  The 
question is whether we can rely on a strict interpretation by the Indian 
authorities of their own citizenship laws.64 
 
UK representatives in both Karachi and Delhi thus agreed on the need to “exclude from 
citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies, persons of obvious connections with 
India and Pakistan by race and habitation, who do not automatically acquire citizenship 
of those countries on the date their respective Acts come into force”.65   
In November 1951 Pakistan pressed for a reply to its request for formal 
recognition.  In the view of the High Commissioner in Karachi, it was very likely that 
the Pakistani government was “postponing publication of their [own] Citizenship Rules 
… until they have our reply on this point”.  But again the response on the part of the 
British was to play for time, and not commit to doing anything until the Pakistani 
authorities themselves had made the necessary arrangements for potential Pakistan 
citizens, whether at home or overseas, to get themselves registered before London 
issued any declaration.66  In another meeting with the High Commissioner, the 
representative of the Ministry of the Interior Hamiduddin Ahmed claimed that “if 
Pakistan was entitled to a declaration, she should have it”, but seemed to acknowledge 
the UK’s difficulties:  “indeed, he said that we [the UK] should apparently get all the 
refugees”.  But while the High Commissioner felt that his discussion with Ahmed had 
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succeeded in “holding the position for the moment”, the British could not expect the 
Pakistanis 
To acquiesce in an indefinite delay in the issue.  Moreover … this delay makes 
it difficult for us to cope with people who do not want Pakistani citizenship and 
are pinning their faith on to Section 13[2].  We can hope therefore that some 
[way] out of the present impasse can be found.67 
 
In response to London’s desire that the High Commissioner would be able to persuade 
the Pakistani authorities that there was no affront being offered or intended by Britain’s 
deliberate policy of refraining from issuing a declaration, he suggested leaving   
The next move to the Pakistanis so as to avoid getting involved in discussion 
whether we are treating them as an inferior sort of Commonwealth country.  If, 
however, they do raise the point again, we shall … be careful not to suggest that 
there is any question of their request not being accepted eventually … We shall 
also do our best to restrain the impatience of those people, many of whom know 
about Section 13[8], and continue to ask why, after all this time, it cannot apply 
to them.68 
 
Since these difficulties had arisen for the most part because the Pakistan legislation 
contained no provisions for Pakistanis overseas to acquire Pakistan citizenship (“as it 
was reasonable to expect that it would”), and because Pakistani had taken no steps to 
facilitate the registration that was provided for instead, “in short, the difficulties really 
are of the Pakistanis’ own making”.69 
In April 1952, as promised, a further bill to amend the 1951 legislation was 
introduced into the Pakistan Constituent Assembly.  Its main purpose, to contemporary 
observers, was to confirm the citizenship of those refugee government servants and 
other migrants who had arrived in the country before the 1951 Act.70  In the view of the 
Pakistani Ministry of the Interior, a regretful lack of previous experience on its part had 
necessitated bringing in an amended bill so soon.  The earlier Act was deemed to have 
militated against the interests of the many millions of Muslims displaced from across 
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the Indian border, who under its provisions had been required to register individually 
upon arrival in Pakistan.  In view of the large upsurge in numbers once again crossing 
from India into Pakistan in the early 1950s, changing this requirement had now become 
a very pressing practical matter.71  According to these 1952 revisions, citizenship could 
still be acquired in one of the same five ways:  birth, descent, migration, naturalisation 
and marriage.  Anyone born in undivided India still qualified to be become a citizen of 
Pakistan as long as they had been living permanently in the territory that was now 
Pakistan since before 13 April 1951.  Likewise, if their parents or grandparents had 
been present there before that date, the same citizenship rights applied.  However, 
citizenship would now be granted more or less routinely to someone who had migrated 
before 13 April 1951, though if they had arrived later than this – that is, between 13 
April 1951 and 1 January 1952 - they would need to complete a further year’s domicile 
and be registered under the new rules in order to qualify.  For anyone who arrived after 
1 January 1952, and who was not already a citizen of Pakistan by some other means, 
citizenship could only be acquired if it was specially permitted by the government.   
The Pakistani authorities, not surprisingly, presented these changes as 
concessions made for the benefit of the country’s many refugees.  As the headlines of 
pro-government newspapers boldly trumpeted the day after the amended bill was 
passed: ‘8 Million Refugees to get Citizenship.  All formalities waived’.72  But while 
the former procedures determining citizenship had now been brought more closely into 
line with the unfolding, and perhaps unanticipated, circumstances of the early 1950s, a 
question mark continued to hang over the status of the large numbers who continued to 
arrive in Pakistan from 1952 onwards.73  Hence, the amendments to the Pakistan 
Citizenship Act, in turn, required a refined set of Pakistan Citizenship Rules,74 issued 
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later the same year, but the extent of the practical difficulties that the Pakistani 
government encountered in trying to get its new procedures to work smoothly was 
reflected in an April 1952 Ministry of the Interior letter, which stated that registration 
was still necessary except in the cases of those people who were “automatically” 
citizens of Pakistan upon the Act’s commencement.  This admission was seized upon 
by British officials to signal that Pakistan had at long last accepted that its citizenship 
could be conferred without the need for registration, something that previously had 
been consistently denied by Pakistani officials.75 
 India, as mentioned above, took considerably longer than Pakistan in drawing 
up specific citizenship legislation, relying instead for nearly a decade after 
independence on articles included in its 1950 Constitution.  In 1954, for instance, the 
possibility of an Indian citizenship act ever reaching the statute book had seemed as 
remote as ever, with British officials wondering whether they should “put this file away 
for the time being?”76  As with Pakistan, London watched developments closely.  Again 
the main British concern was that “as few as possible of the number of Indian 
communities in foreign countries should be left to become UKC citizens under section 
13[2] of the British Nationality Act, 1948”, since, unless people of Indian origin living 
outside India (except in Pakistan) applied for registration, they – as ‘British subjects 
without citizenship’ – would become UKC citizens as soon as the British government 
officially recognised the Indian legislation. The Foreign Office’s advice under these 
circumstances was for “a fairly long interval, of at least a year, to elapse” between the 
entry into force of any Indian citizenship act and its recognition under Section 32[8] of 
the BNA.77   
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 In May 1955, however, the Indian government finally introduced its citizenship 
bill into Parliament.78  In the run-up to it being debated in July, Delhi welcomed 
feedback from London, indicating that it would be prepared to introduce changes in the 
text if any of the British comments were deemed acceptable.79  On the whole, the 
British regarded the contents of this bill as “carefully-drawn” but, even when read 
together with Articles 5 to 11 of the Indian Constitution, officials remained 
unconvinced that it would have the effect “of automatically conferring citizenship on 
all those categories of persons defined in Section 32[7] of the British Nationality Act as 
‘potentially citizens’ of India”.  Should the bill be enacted as it then stood, and the UK 
government was to recognise it (and also the citizenship provisions of the Indian 
Constitution), then the fact remained that 
A very large number of persons of Indian origin in India and throughout the 
world, would acquire the status of citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies 
… and as far as those in foreign countries are concerned subsequent generations 
would be able to do likewise.  It would appear that amendments of very 
considerable substance to the Bill would be necessary in order to remove this 
undesirable consequence of recognition and we feel it unlikely that the 
Government of India would be prepared to make them.80 
 
“Lakhs81 if not millions” of people, they suggested, might well be involved, and so, on 
the basis that “the number of persons of Indian origin, and without any connections 
with the United Kingdom who are affected … would presumably run into many 
hundreds of thousands”,82 it was decided that the 1955 Indian Citizenship Act and the 
citizenship articles of the Constitution (nor for that matter the Pakistan Citizenship Act) 
should not be declared a citizenship law, even though London could now not ask, or 
expect, Delhi (like Karachi) to recognise the BNA in return.83  That India expected the 
UK to “mop up” all those who failed to acquire its citizenship - as quid pro quo for 
Indian declaration of the BNA - was “staggering”,84 but quite in line with 
 26 
The general belief in India, which one encounters in all sorts of ways, 
sometimes at quite high levels of officialdom, that there are only two types of 
country – India and ‘foreign countries’ – and two types of people – Indians and 
‘foreigners’.  It is a result, [the High Commissioner supposed], of the feeling 
during the first few years of Independence that for the first time India was really 
a unit;  everyone and everything else was lumped together as ‘non-Indian’.85 
 
In the final analysis, the failure (perhaps understandable in view of Partition’s 
unfinished business as far as cross-border migration was concerned) of the Indian 
government to amend its bill, as advised by London, to confer Indian citizenship 
automatically on all people “born either in India or of Indian fathers, who were born 
before 26 January 1950 and are domiciled outside India or have migrated to India from 
Pakistan” proved to be too big a stumbling block.86  And so as with Pakistan, whose 
citizenship legislation was regarded as “equally unsatisfactory in this respect”, the 
British government postponed declaring both acts indefinitely.   
 
Potential Pakistanis or would-be Indians? 
 
Discussions between London, Delhi and Karachi about the shortcomings and liabilities, 
from a British point of view, of Pakistani and Indian citizenship legislation in the early 
years following independence were repeatedly punctuated with concerns that as long as 
the members of sizeable communities of so-called ‘Indian’ origin based outside the 
subcontinent failed to register as citizens of Pakistan and India within the period 
allowed for this, they would remain ‘British subjects without citizenship’ with the 
burden of protecting them in these foreign countries falling on the UK’s representatives 
there.  What complicated the picture was that well into the 1950s British consulates 
around the world were charged with processing the passports and other travel 
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documents belonging to Indians and Pakistanis in the absence of their own consular 
services.  This last section therefore looks at a number of individual cases concerning 
‘potential Pakistanis’ (in some instances ‘would-be Indians’) that highlight the 
complicated relationships trailing in the wake of the formal end of empire, and the 
extent to which the day-to-day realities of decolonisation stretched on over many years.  
While available records do not necessarily provide details of their final outcome, taken 
en masse they reveal some of the challenges involved in working out in practice the 
citizenship of people of South Asian origin who lived outside its geographical 
boundaries.  As in the subcontinent itself, issues of identity, allegiance and government 
responsibility were not amenable to water-tight legislation, and so the implementation 
of citizenship rules elsewhere in the world proved equally fraught with inconsistencies 
and anomalies.   
 The impact of imperial rule on undivided India had resulted, over decades if not 
centuries, in many ordinary people moving to live and work in other parts of the 
empire.87  In addition, large numbers were drawn to opportunities for employment in 
places not under direct British control. In the period following independence, these 
expatriate communities were said to include as many as 200,000 in Burma, some 
30,000 in South Africa, nearly 15,000 in Madagascar, 5,000 in what was still referred to 
as Siam, 2,500 in Iraq, and thousands more in small groups scattered throughout the 
Middle East and Africa.88  It was in British interests, therefore, for these people, where 
eligible, to register as soon as possible as ‘potential Pakistanis’ or ‘would-be Indians’, 
and in this way avoid the complications of subjecthood without citizenship.  How to 
make this happen, however, was not straightforward as by the early 1950s both India 
and Pakistan had still not been able to establish the necessary diplomatic representation 
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in many of the places where their likely citizens were living, and so British consuls 
instead frequently found themselves acting as a channel of communication on their 
behalf.  In the meantime, in view of impending legislation supposedly soon to come out 
of Karachi and New Delhi, consulates were instructed to limit the validity of new 
passports granted to ‘British subjects without citizenship’, as general rule only 
extending them to 30 June 1952 at the latest.89   
 A conversation between the High Commissioner in Karachi and Pakistan’s 
Chief Passport Officer in December 1953 underlined the extent of the problems 
involved.  As the High Commissioner pointed out, if the Pakistani authorities wished 
British consuls to assist people of Pakistan origin to acquire Pakistan citizenship or to 
obtain Pakistan passports in countries where Pakistan had no representative, then the 
UK government urgently needed clarification on the relevant citizenship rules involved.  
In response, SH Firoz suggested that, where this was possible, such applications could 
be processed by the nearest Pakistan representative, or by a Pakistani representative 
who would periodically visit the country in which an applicant was living.  This was 
already what happened in relation to people of ‘Pakistan origin’ living in countries such 
as Italian Somaliland and Madagascar, who had been instructed to apply to the 
Pakistani Commissioner stationed in Nairobi in British East Africa.  Similarly, in the 
Persian Gulf, the Pakistani vice-consul for Basra would visit Kuwait and Bahrain 
periodically to deal with applications on the spot.90  In the case of Madagascar, the vast 
majority of people of Indian origin hailed from the former Kathiawar princely states in 
Gujarat but because they were for the most part Muslim, this meant that they might 
want citizenship of Pakistan rather than of India.  As the Foreign Office commented, “if 
a person in this category would prefer to become a Pakistan citizen rather than a citizen 
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of India there is no reason why he should not apply to the Government of Pakistan for 
registration … even if he has never been domiciled in Pakistan”.91  
 Similar levels of practical ambiguity concerned ‘potential Pakistanis’ living in 
Italian Somaliland in the early 1950s.  Here they fell into two categories:  ‘British 
subjects without citizenship’, and ‘natives’ (or descendants of ‘natives’) of former 
Indian princely states, who, it was assumed, because they were Muslims would prefer 
the prospect of Pakistani citizenship. What complicated matters further was that unless 
they were able to prove themselves to be Pakistanis, they faced the grave danger of 
being subject to the jurisdiction of Qadi (religious) courts:  it was “the practice of the 
Qadis to tell a Pakistani who objected to being summoned to appear in the Shariah 
courts that he must either accept [their] jurisdiction … or renounce Islam”. Under these 
circumstances, the only option was to acknowledge the status of this particular 
individual as a ‘British subject without citizenship’.  Although this seemed like “a false 
dilemma” in British eyes, officials did recognise that “the interest of the Administration 
of Somalia is on the side of the Qadis and of [those] Somalis who bring suits against 
wealthy Pakistanis with the object of extorting money”.92  As the consul in Mogadishu 
explained, 
Some six weeks ago I was again approached by the Pakistanis to say that they 
were having difficulties over being hauled by Somalis in front of the Qadis’ 
Courts.  I spoke to a rather inept little man who is in charge of the Legal 
Department, and he told me that there was one such case, where the Pakistani 
was a Muslim, and that the Pakistani had appealed to the Administrator.  I was 
assured that a decision would be given very shortly, and that the decision would 
settle the matter once and for all.  Since I had obtained some few months back 
an assurance in writing from the Administrator that Pakistanis were not 
considered to be under the Qadis’ jurisdiction except for matters of personal 
status, I did not press the matter. … [However] while the Qadi had recognised 
the man to be a Pakistani, [he] had nevertheless claimed to have competence … 
[the Italian authorities then went] into the question of whether the man was in 
fact a Pakistani under Pakistani law, since the latter obliged him to register his 
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declaration within one year of the law and there was no evidence that he had 
done so.93 
  
But while the British consul had been authorised to grant these people passports valid 
until the end of March 1954, simply possessing one was not sufficient to exempt these 
‘potential Pakistanis’ from Qadi jurisdiction.94  And the Pakistani authorities also made 
it clear that, in their view, passports were still not the accepted marker of formal 
national identity that they were later to become:95  
Persons who have not acquired Pakistani citizenship and hold Pakistani 
passports fulfil the requirement of certain laws such as the Pakistan Control of 
Entry Act 1952, but they do not thereby legally acquire the status of a citizen of 
Pakistan.  While a passport may be evidence in favour of nationality, it is not 
conducive evidence, and only has effect in relation to the question of national 
status.96 
 
 A somewhat different permutation of problems involved members of Muslim 
communities from the subcontinent located in various parts of the Persian Gulf.  Here 
there was great reluctance, for instance, on the part of individuals living in Muscat, for 
instance, to apply for either Indian or Pakistani citizenship, as illustrated by the case of 
one Mohammed Moosa Jaffer Matwani born in Matrah (Muscat) who applied for a 
British passport in July 1952.  While both his father and his brother had obtained 
British passports for the first time in 1943 (when passports had been granted much 
more freely), in the absence of proof that his father had registered continuously for 
fifteen years as a British subject, Matwani was informed that unless he could produce 
evidence of descent from an ancestor in the male line born in British territory and of his 
father’s British nationality, he would not be issued with a passport.  Instead it was 
suggested that he apply for Indian, Pakistani or even Muscat citizenship.97  The longer 
his case dragged on, the more the Muscat consulate believed that Matwani’s real aim 
was to be regarded as a ‘British subject without citizenship’ and on that basis 
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eventually to become a UKC citizen.98  The difficulty from a British point of view was 
that while it had been agreed earlier in the 1950s that applications for Pakistani 
citizenship made by individuals, such as Matwani, who lived in Muscat would be sent 
to the Pakistan Vice Consul in Basra, by 1954 none of those applying for Pakistan 
passports had so far received them.  Hence, since British did “not wish to discourage 
persons from applying for recognition as Pakistan citizens”, passport-issuing officers in 
the Persian Gulf states were allowed to extend for a further, albeit limited, period any 
passports belonging to people who fell into this category.99   
 In late 1953, the Foreign Office in London received complaints from the Aga 
Khan that some of his followers living in nearby Gwadur had been wrongfully denied 
recognition as ‘British Subjects’.  Gwadur, prior to 1874, had been part of the former 
Indian princely state of Kalat, but while only the first generation born outside former 
Indian states was supposed to be treated as ‘British Protected Persons’, it recognised 
that in the Persian Gulf many second and third generation people falling into the 
category had also enjoyed this status.  Hence, the Foreign Office suggested only 
investigating specific cases rather than trying to offer a wider explanation:  moreover, 
they could hardly propose to the Aga Khan, as the Muscat consulate had suggested, that 
his followers should consider applying for registration as citizens of India as “it would 
… probably be useless for them to apply:  as they are not Hindus, their applications 
would almost certainly be rejected”, an assumption on the part of British officials that 
points to the well-known problems that minorities faced in proving their political 
loyalties whether in India or Pakistan.100 The reluctance of this particular expatriate 
Muslim community “to take [either] Indian or Pakistani passports” in practice had a 
great deal to do with the on-going estrangement between the two states, which were no 
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closer in the mid-1950s to being reconciled than they had been immediately after 
independence.  For merchants who frequently needed to travel to both India and 
Pakistan in connection with their business, the difficulty experienced by nationals of 
one obtaining a visa to visit the other was well worth trying to circumvent with a UKC 
passport. But because of the challenge of distinguishing the names of Ismailis from 
other entries (such as those, for instance, of Khojas) in local ‘British Subjects’ registers 
– made even trickier at the time of the Aga Khan’s complaint because most community 
elders had gone to attend his Platinum Jubilee celebrations taking place in Karachi in 
early 1954 – British officials found it difficult to work out just how many Ismailis in 
Gwadur had  been registered as ‘British protected persons’ or as ‘British subjects’, as 
the example of the Aga Khan’s own Mukhi (or Minister) in Gwador, Ahmedbhoy 
Alibhoy, illustrated: 
His name appears in the register of British Protected Persons in 1937 with 
renewals in 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941.  However although his own and his 
father’s place of birth were shown in a passport application in 1942 as Gwadur, 
his grandfather’s was shown as Karachi in 1847, and we recently allowed his 
claim to being a British subject by descent.  Neither at the time of making his 
1942 declaration or when we allowed the claim did he reveal that he had 
received a previous passport as a British Protected Person in Karachi in 1927 
and at this Consulate in 1932, facts that we have only discovered from an old 
passport register.  We have allowed similar evidence to be produced in several 
other cases, from which it will be seen that we have certainly not dealt with 
these cases as strictly as we might.  Latterly, however, we have suspected that, 
having come to realise the formula, people may be deliberately concealing 
evidence and getting certificates somewhat lightly signed.  We have therefore 
insisted upon sworn affidavits being obtained in the future. 
 
The real problem with these Gwadur-based Ismailis was not so much their failure to 
seek to register as ‘British subjects’, but that few of them were able to produce 
passports going back the requisite twenty years, or other similar documents, needed to 
substantiate their claims.  Whereas most Khojas on the whole seemed content to apply 
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for Pakistani, Indian or even Muscat citizenship, it seems that Ismailis wanted to retain 
their British passports “whatever the circumstances”.101 
 Sometimes the uncertain status of particular cases risked complicating Britain’s 
own relations with third-party states.  For a small community of Hindus, hailing 
originally from what was now the Pakistani province of Sindh, British negotiations with 
the Spanish government concerning the abolition of capitulatory rights102 in the Spanish 
zone of Morocco made it necessary by the early 1950s to clarify their position under 
Pakistani citizenship legislation.  Most if not all of the 117 or so individuals concerned 
possessed a ‘domicile of origin’ in Pakistan since, at the time when they had been born, 
their parents had lived in the Sindhi city of Hyderabad.103  It was thus “a matter of … 
urgency to find some way to determine which of [these] British subjects who were born 
in Pakistan, and who have not secured for themselves recognition as citizens of India, 
are citizens of Pakistan”.104  However, until there was a representative of Pakistan in 
Spanish Morocco, Britain had no choice but to remain responsible for their protection, 
which as elsewhere included handling day-to-day requests for passport applications and 
extensions.  By late 1953, UK High Commissioner’s Office in Karachi doubted that it 
would ever succeed in attracting a reply from the Pakistani authorities about the status 
of these potential Hindu Pakistanis:  “the unfortunate disclosure of [their] religion … 
may not be unconnected with the delay in getting a decision on their status.  If the 
majority of them are in fact Hindus … the Pakistani authorities will be very reluctant to 
admit that they have any claim to Pakistan citizenship and the delay in giving a reply 
may therefore be deliberate”.105  The growing complexity of the case made it 
particularly hard to grasp; as the British Consul-General in Tetuan apologised,  
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I regret that, in spite of all your kind efforts at enlightenment, my inadequate 
brain is still in a dreadful muddle on the question of the exact status of these 
persons.  But I have, at least, got it into my head that we are to regard all 
persons having once had a domicile in what is now Pakistan, as citizens of that 
country whether they have put themselves straight with the Government of 
Pakistan or not.  In fact, we are not interested in what Pakistan thinks about 
them, nor what they think about themselves, which is all to the good as most of 
them are Hindus and no amount of pushing by us would ever make them declare 
themselves Pakistanis.  … Meanwhile there is a Pakistan Ambassador in Madrid 
who could perhaps be considered as having jurisdiction over Pakistani citizens 
in Spanish Morocco (even though they refuse to recognise him) … It would be 
so nice to be able to refer all the people we consider to be citizens of Pakistan to 
[him] whenever they get into trouble!  But I fear [this would be] too good to be 
true.106 
 
Unfortunately for the Consul-General, until the Pakistan authorities had agreed that the 
Sindhi Hindus residing in his district should be regarded as their citizens, there could be 
“no question of referring anyone … to the Pakistan Ambassador in Madrid”.107  
Eventually, in July 1954, confirmation along these lines was received from the new 
Chief Passport Officer of the Government of Pakistan, Mohammad Ahmad, who 
clarified that “under Section 3 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act the acquisition of 
Pakistani citizenship [was] automatic and not dependent upon registration”.108  This, of 
course, had long been the view of British officials, although it was usually still “denied 
by the Pakistanis when … asked about it”.  Thus, Karachi confirmed that someone who 
had lived all his life in Spanish Morocco, or for that matter elsewhere, could, without 
having to register, “be a citizen of Pakistan if any of this parents or grandparents [had 
been] born in the Indian subcontinent and he was of Pakistani domicile”.  By now, 
however, many of this small batch of ‘potential Pakistanis’ in North Africa had chosen 
instead to apply, as ‘would-be Indians’, for citizenship via the Indian embassy in Paris, 
a course that British representatives in Tetuan had been recommending “whenever 
possible” in order “to get them off our hands”.109  
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Conclusion 
 
This article has considered the unfinished business of decolonisation, interrelations 
taking place within the ‘new Commonwealth’, and British post-colonial anxieties in 
relation to the consequences of new citizenship legislation for people either living in or 
associated with former British India in the years following independence.  The cases 
under scrutiny have highlighted the various ways in which reconciling the provisions of 
the 1948 British Nationality Act with the process of pinning down and legislating 
citizenship in India and Pakistan proved more difficult to achieve than the British had 
expected.  These complexities also stretched beyond the boundaries of the subcontinent, 
to places where people of South Asian origin had lived for generations but which were 
by the 1950s neither colonies nor former colonies of the British Empire.  Faced with the 
prospect of having to shoulder the burden of thousands of prospective non-Europeans 
who had not acquired an alternative citizenship, either because they did not want to 
become Indians or Pakistanis, or because India or Pakistan did not want them, the usual 
British response was to prevaricate. In line with broader trends, ‘de facto measures 
proved the preferred course of action in responding to [the possibility of] unwanted 
New Commonwealth immigration’.110  Officials may occasionally have panicked about 
the possibility of an influx of large numbers of “illiterate and unskilled” Indians into the 
United Kingdom itself,111 but the reality remained that, before the introduction of the 
1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, there was little difference, if any, in United 
Kingdom law between the position of UKC citizens and other British subjects, all of 
whom had the right to enter and live in the United Kingdom.  Meanwhile, large 
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numbers of “pure Europeans” in India and Pakistan who had failed for various reasons - 
ranging from ignorance to inertia to deliberate choice - to register for UKC citizenship 
by the 1 January 1950 deadline were still petitioning vocally for what they perceived as 
their ‘birthright’ – a UKC passport.   
 Thus, in 1957 a new British Nationality Act was introduced which, along with 
some other adjustments, “provided an additional five years for those eligible to register 
as UKC citizens”, extending the opportunity for them to establish their ‘British’ 
credentials under the new arrangements.  However, as has been pointed out with 
reference to this legislation, the 1957 Act failed to make “any provision for the three 
million or so Indians and Pakistanis who had also been left without UKC citizenship 
and [who] might also have described their efforts at imperial living as having ‘served 
Britain well’”.112  In practice, distinctions based on ‘race’ remained the sticking point, 
just as it had been in the late 1940s.  And so, rather than ‘the beginning of the end’, as 
the 1948 BNA had been envisaged by those who drew up its provisions in the context 
of the changing circumstances of the immediate post-war years, it proved to be only 
‘the end of the beginning’ as far as Britain’s experience of South Asian decolonisation - 
and the complications that accompanied it - were concerned.  Likewise, for the newly-
independent states of India and Pakistan, as British legislation in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s would subsequently demonstrate, its legacies shaped relations with their former 
imperial masters for decades to come.  
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